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Abstract 
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent Velvet Revolution in 1989, 
the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) began the complex transition from 
a centrally controlled command economy to a market-based economy. The transition 
necessitated the removal of non-performing loans from state-owned banks’ balance sheets, 
a task assigned by the Ministry of Finance to the newly formed Consolidation Bank 
(Konsolidační Banka, hereafter “KOB”). Established on February 25, 1991, the KOB was 
specifically mandated to acquire and restructure what were known as “TOZ” loans, 
unsecured debt with no amortization schedules and unsustainably high interest rates. The 
KOB used funds from the State Bank of Czechoslovakia to acquire CZK 125 billion 
(approximately $4.2 billion, or about 10% of GDP) in TOZ loans from four state-owned banks. 
The purchase was made at 80% of the loans’ nominal value. In 1993, upon Czechoslovakia’s 
split into two sovereign nations, the KOB’s loan portfolio and operations were divided 
between the Consolidation Bank Prague (CBP) and Consolidation Bank Bratislava. Although 
the CBP took over the management of the bad loan portfolio, it also engaged in many other 
commercial banking activities. The Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic therefore 
decided in 2001 to create the Czech Consolidation Agency (CCA) to handle both the TOZ 
loans and other bad debt that had been accumulated throughout the economic transition 
period. After significantly reducing its assets under management through block sales of 
receivables, the CCA ceased operations on December 31, 2007, transferring the CZK 17.2 
billion remaining on its balance sheet to the Ministry of Finance. 
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At a Glance  
 
The economic liberalization of the former Czech 
and Slovak Federative Republic (CSFR) began in 
the early 1990s with concerted market 
deregulation and a comprehensive program of 
institutional reforms. Among these, the Ministry 
of Finance was tasked with the removal of non-
performing “TOZ” loans (trvale obracející se 
zásoby or “permanently revolving inventories”) 
from state-owned banks’ balance sheets. The 
TOZ loans, which were unsecured and 
automatically rolled over, had been distributed 
by the government in the 1970s in exchange for 
the seizure of special pre-tax funds that 
companies used to pay their operational 
expenses. State-owned businesses would accept 
these loans with the understanding that they 
would then be compelled to re-lend them back to 
the government (Desai 1995; Thorne 1993). 
Although their creation was outlawed at the 
beginning of 1991, the existing TOZ loans posed 
a particular threat to banks’ balance sheets and 
firms as well: inflation pushed interest rates up 
from 6% to an unsustainable 23% and 
companies were unable to negotiate 
replacement loans at commercial rates (Aghevli 
et al. 1992; Desai 1995; Rod 2014).  
In response to concerns about looming budget 
deficits, the Ministry of Finance established the 
Consolidation Bank (Konsolidační Banka, 
hereafter “KOB”) on February 25, 1991, in order 
to acquire the TOZ loans (Desai 1995; Rod 2014). 
The KOB was mandated to restructure the debt 
to have maturities of eight years and bear 
interest at a rate of 13% (Thorne 1993). Using 
funds provided by the State Bank of 
Czechoslovakia and additional loans from other 
Czech and Slovak banks, primarily Czech Savings, 
the KOB purchased CZK 110 billion 
(approximately $3.7 billion) in non-performing 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose:  To relieve state-owned banks of non-
performing loans left over from the centrally 
planned economy and restructure them with more 
favorable terms (Rod 2014).  
Launch Dates   Announcement:  February 
25, 1991  
First transfer: 1991 
Wind-down Dates December 31, 2007, under 
the Czech Consolidation 
Agency  
Size and Type of NPL 
Problem  
20% of banking system loans 
in 1991 (Hayri and 
McDermott 1995) 
State-directed “TOZ” loans to 
state-owned enterprises 
Program Size Not specified at outset 
Eligible Institutions  State-owned banks that were 




Usage Approximately CZK 125 
billion in loans acquired from 
four institutions between 
1991 and 1992 (Desai 1995; 
Rod 2014) 
Outcomes Unclear how much was 
realized as a result of the 
disposition of assets  
In 2007, the Czech 
Consolidation Agency 
transferred CZK 17.2 billion 
in remaining assets to the 
Ministry of Finance  
Ownership Structure Government-owned 
Notable Features KOB transferred operations 
to Consolidation Bank 
Prague upon separation of 
Czechoslovakia into two 
sovereign states 
Czech and Slovak Federative Republic: Consolidation 
Bank (KOB) 
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TOZ loans, which comprised almost 20% of all loans to businesses at the time (Desai 1995). 
In 1992, the KOB conducted its second round of acquisitions, removing CZK 15 billion in bad 
assets from commercial banks’ balance sheets at a 20% discount (Horčicová and Payson 
1997).  
The KOB ceased operations upon the peaceful breakup of the CSFR into the sovereign states 
of Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. It then transferred its loan portfolio and operations 
to the Consolidation Bank Prague (CBP) and Consolidation Bank Bratislava. In addition to 
managing CZK 83.5 billion of the leftover TOZ loans, the CBP took on the responsibilities of 
a regular commercial bank. It ended its bad-loan operations upon the creation of the Czech 
Consolidation Agency (CCA) in 2001, a newly formed institution meant to resolve what 
remained of the portfolio. After significantly reducing its assets under management through 
block sales of receivables, the CCA terminated its operations on December 31, 2007, 
transferring the CZK 17.2 billion remaining on its balance sheet to the Czech Ministry of 
Finance (Rod 2014). It is unclear from secondary sources how much was realized through 
the disposition of the KOB portfolio.  
Summary Evaluation 
Academic evaluations of the KOB, when available, paint a mixed legacy of success. Its 
operations were considered to be “partial” in that they left banks to deal with a sizeable 
volume of non-performing loans (Aghevli et al. 1992). According to Bonin and Huang (2000), 
the transfer of bad assets was ultimately unsuccessful in contributing to a strong domestic 
financial sector, one that would be able to compete in a globalized market. However, 
Horčicová and Payson (1997) attribute this lack of success to the transitionary economic 


















Konsolidační Banka : Czech and Slovak Federative Republic Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
S40.5 billion in 1990 
$29.7 billion in 1991 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$3,917 in 1990 
$2,879 in 1991 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt)  
Data for 1990: 
Moody’s: Data unavailable 
S&P: Data unavailable 
Fitch: Data unavailable 
 
Data for 1991: 
Moody’s: Data unavailable 
S&P: Data unavailable 
Fitch: Data unavailable 
Size of banking system  
Data not available for 1990 
Data not available for 1991 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP  
Data not available for 1990 
Data not available for 1991 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system  
Data not available for 1998 
Data not available for 1999 
5-bank concentration of banking system  
Data not available for 1990 
Data not available for 1991 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
Data not available for 1990 
Data not available for 1991 
Government ownership of banking system 
100% in 1990 
100% in 1991 
Existence of deposit insurance 
No in 1990 
No in 1991 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: The Czechoslovakian government established the 
Consolidation Bank (KOB) in order to remove NPLs from state-owned banks that 
it was recapitalizing in preparation for privatization.  
Beginning in 1991, the Ministry of Finance of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic 
undertook a program of restructuring efforts in order to prepare for the national transition 
to a market-based economy (Rod 2014). One step in the process involved recapitalizing state 
banks through an allocation of five-year bonds worth approximately 8% of all bank loans to 
state-owned enterprises. In order to determine recapitalization amounts, the government 
asked the state banks what portion of non-performing loans should be removed from their 
balance sheets (Desai 1995). 
The Czechoslovakian government positioned the KOB’s operations as a necessary step 
toward privatization. According to the Consolidation Bank Prague 1994 Annual Report, the 
KOB was established in order to “deal with the consequences of certain decisions from the 
time of the centrally planned economy, when loans failed to meet their main economic role 
of a mechanism for the optimal allocation of capital” (Rod 2014). 
2. Legal Authority: It is unclear what legislation or legal authority was used to 
establish or govern the KOB.  
The Ministry of Finance was responsible for the creation of the KOB by governmental decree 
(Desai 1995).  
3. Special Powers: The KOB did not appear to have special powers to enforce 
collection or restructuring on delinquent borrowers. 
Secondary sources consulted did not provide evidence of special powers.  
4. Mandate: The KOB’s mandate was to restructure non-performing loans at market 
rates.  
The government utilized the newly formed KOB as a repository for bad loans that needed to 
be disposed of prior to banks’ privatization. The KOB purchased TOZ loans off state banks’ 
balance sheets and restructured them with eight-year maturities bearing interest rates of 
13%, dependent on the discount rate (Desai 1995; Thorne 1993). According to leading 
expert on Czechoslovakian economics, Dr. Aleš Rod, the government anticipated that the old 
loans would be more easily refinanced within the context of the newly formed commercial 
banking sector.  
Although the government established KOB specifically to handle bad loans, its operations 
were later extended in 1992 to encompass more regular banking activities (Rod 2014). 
According to Dr. Rod, the KOB operated with a limited banking license that enabled it to 
accept deposits from legal entities, provide and manage loans within the scope of the bank's 
216
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business plan, and work out payments and settlements without payments with foreign 
countries.  
5. Ownership Structure: The KOB was owned and operated by the Czechoslovakian 
government.   
All Czechoslovakian banking institutions created between the years 1989 and 1991 were 
government-owned (Rod 2014).  
6. Governance/Administration: Details regarding internal governance and 
administration are unclear from secondary sources consulted.  
Although annual reports for the KOB’s operations exist, they have not yet been translated or 
digitized.  
7. Size: The Czechoslovakian government does not seem to have set a specific cap 
on the size of the KOB’s operations.   
Secondary resources consulted do not mention any cap on the size of the program.  
8. Funding Sources: As a public institution, the KOB utilized funds from a number of 
state-owned banks in order to carry out its loan purchases.  
Initially, the KOB was charged with purchasing CZK 110 billion in TOZ loans from the Czech 
Commercial Bank and Slovak General Credit Bank. The State Bank of Czechoslovakia, the 
central bank, provided funds for these purchases at a real interest rate of -3%. Other Czech 
and Slovak banks, notably Czech Savings, provided funds at an average interest rate of 11%, 
or a real interest rate of -1% (Desai 1995). 
9.  Eligible Institutions: Initially, the four state-owned Czechoslovakian banks that 
held TOZ loans were eligible for assistance from the KOB.  
These four banks (Commercial Bank, Investment Bank, General Credit Bank of Slovakia, and 
Czechoslovak Trade Bank) held non-performing TOZ loans generated by the government in 
the decades leading up to privatization. In 1992, the KOB purchased CZK 14.7 billion in (non-
TOZ) bad loans from Commercial Bank and Investment Bank (Rod 2014).3  
It appears from secondary sources consulted that any state-owned Czechoslovakian bank 
that held non-performing loans and was slated for privatization was eligible for participation 
(Desai 1995; Rod 2014). As previously noted, it seems that the government compelled 
participation in the program as a requirement for recapitalization (Desai 1995).  
 
3 It is unclear from sources consulted whether the KOB purchased TOZ loans from Trade Bank.  
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10. Eligible Assets: In addition to the removal of TOZ loans from state banks’ balance 
sheets, the KOB was also charged with the acquisition of other bad loans that 
would interfere with the transition to a market-based economy. 
These non-performing loans, known as “trvale obracející se zásoby”—“TOZ” loans or, 
literally, “permanently revolving inventories”—were the result of a concerted government 
effort in the 1970s to seize special pre-tax reserves used by state-owned enterprises to 
finance their operating expenses. In their place, Czechoslovakian authorities began 
distributing these unsecured TOZ loans to enterprises with the expectation that they would 
be re-lent to the government. When interest rates on the TOZ loans increased sharply from 
6% to 23% in 1989, the threat of large budget deficits pushed the government to recapitalize 
banks in exchange for the removal of TOZ loans from their balance sheets (Desai 1995). 
The KOB also took on bad debt that accumulated during the first stage of economic transition, 
including non-performing loans made in relation to new foreign investment and “pioneer” 
loans made to new private companies (Horčicová and Payson 1997).  
11.  Acquisition (Mechanics): There were two rounds of purchases during which the 
KOB acquired assets using funds borrowed from the central bank and other 
state-owned banks.  
The KOB purchased CZK 110 billion (approximately $3.7 billion) in non-performing TOZ 
loans, which comprised almost 20% of all loans to businesses at the time (Desai 1995). In 
1992, the KOB conducted its second round of acquisitions, removing CZK 15 billion in bad 
assets from commercial banks’ balance sheets at a 20% discount (Horčicová and Payson 
1997). These acquisitions were considered to comprise “a large portion of loan collection 
from bank clients” (Desai 1995). 
12.  Acquisition (Pricing): It is unclear what methodology the Czechoslovakian 
government used to determine the pricing of the TOZ loans. 
The first CZK 110 billion purchase of TOZ loans from the largest Czech and Slovak banks was 
carried out for 80% of their nominal value (Desai 1995). 
13.  Recovery and Disposal: A successor institution to the KOB, the Czech 
Consolidation Agency, disposed of assets under management through block sales 
of receivables.   
The KOB was split up into two separate banks—Consolidation Bank Prague (CBP) and 
Consolidation Bank Bratislava—upon the breakup of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Following the 
split, the CBP took on the responsibilities and operations of a “normal” commercial bank 
(Rod 2014).  
On September 1, 2001, the government of the Czech Republic created the Czech 
Consolidation Agency (CCA) for the express purpose of dealing with the bad loan portfolios 
of the CBP. Though it is unclear from sources consulted whether the CCA was created as a 
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designated asset management company, it seemed as though the KOB continued to hold 
nonperforming loans without attempting to collect (Rod 2014).  
After significantly reducing its assets under management through block sales of receivables,4 
the CCA ceased operations on December 31, 2007, transferring the CZK 17.2 billion 
remaining on its balance sheet to the Ministry of Finance (Rod 2014). 
14.  Timeframe: Although the KOB was initially given a temporary license to carry 
out loan operations for four months, its timeframe was later extended to six 
months.  
The KOB as an institution existed from February 25, 1991, through December 31, 1992, at 
which point its portfolio and responsibilities were split between the newly formed 
Consolidation Bank Prague and Consolidation Bank Bratislava (Desai 1995; Rod 2014).  
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